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Abstract 
Since the release of Napster in 1999, peer-to-peer file-sharing has 
enjoyed a dramatic rise in popularity. A 2000 study by Plonka on the 
University of Wisconsin campus network found that file-sharing 
accounted for a comparable volume of traffic to web applications, 
while a 2002 study by Saroiu et al. on the University of Washington 
campus network found that file-sharing accounted for more than 
treble the volume of web traffic observed, thus affirming the 
significance of P2P in the context of Internet traffic. Empirical 
studies of peer-to-peer traffic are essential for supporting the design 
of next-generation peer-to-peer systems, informing the provisioning 
of network infrastructure and underpinning the policing of peer-to-
peer systems. This paper surveys existing work in the field of peer-
to-peer monitoring and based upon this assessment of the state-of-
the-art describes the design and implementation of the Open P2P 
tracing system, which aims to improve the research community’s 
understanding of P2P file sharing systems by providing continuous 
and up-to-date traffic data which is anonymized and made freely 
accessible to all interested parties. Data from this system has been 
used in a variety of projects and papers, which are used to illustrate 
the broad range of research that can benefit from an open tracing 
system. 
1.  Introduction 
Since the release of Napster [1] in 1999, peer-to-peer (P2P) 
file-sharing has enjoyed a meteoric rise in popularity, to the 
point that P2P applications are now widely considered to be 
responsible for more traffic than any other Internet application 
[2]. Given the scale of P2P traffic, understanding traffic 
characteristics is of critical importance and has specific 
benefits in the context of: i) provisioning network 
infrastructure, ii) informing network policy, iii) informing the 
design of new P2P applications and managing existing P2P 
communities and iv) policing P2P systems. 
Many significant studies of P2P file sharing systems have been 
performed. These studies have illuminated a range of P2P 
characteristics; however, we believe that there remain 
significant shortcomings in the current body of research on 
P2P file sharing systems. These shortcomings include: 
 The extensive use of closed data sets, which prevents the 
findings of existing studies being revisited. Furthermore, 
as truly representative P2P traces may take months or 
even years to perform, the use of closed data-sets has led 
to significant and unnecessary duplication of effort. 
 Trend analysis is poorly supported by existing studies, 
which, with a few exceptions [3] [4], are not of sufficient 
duration to reveal long-term trends in user behaviour. 
 Cross discipline perspectives are often lacking in existing 
studies, which tend to concern themselves largely with 
technical factors and often fail to consider factors such as 
group psychology, the economics of file sharing and the 
ethics of monitoring real-world distributed systems. 
We suggest that these shortcomings may be addressed through 
the development of an ‘Open P2P Tracing System’ which aims 
to produce a significant, public and freely accessible data-set. 
Such a system would monitor P2P traffic on a long-term basis 
and make it available in near real-time, allowing the 
identification of trends and the revisiting of data points by 
researchers using different methodologies. Access to the data 
should also be simplified as far as possible to encourage the 
use of this data set by researchers from non-computing 
backgrounds and in particular sociology, psychology, 
economics and law. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 
provides a brief classification of P2P monitoring 
methodologies. Section 3 surveys the state-of-the-art in P2P 
monitoring technologies and studies. Section 4 discusses the 
limitations of current P2P approaches. Section 5 presents the 
design and an initial evaluation of an Open P2P Tracing 
System. Finally section 5 discusses how the open tracing 
system has been exploited to perform research. Finally section 
6 discusses avenues for future work and concludes. 
2. P2P Tracing Methodologies 
Empirical studies of P2P systems may be classified as using 
one of three broad tracing methodologies: network-level 
tracing, passive application-level tracing or active application-
level tracing [5]. 
Network-level traces are performed by deploying code on core 
or gateway network infrastructure and performing IP-level 
packet monitoring. Network-level tracing is transparent to the 
P2P network, however, this approach introduces local bias, 
which results from deployment location and accurate 
identification of P2P traffic can be highly problematic. 
Passive application-level traces are performed by monitoring 
the messages passed at the application level. In modern 
decentralized file-sharing systems all peers participate in 
message passing and therefore passive monitoring can be 
achieved simply by modifying a peer to log the messages that 
it is required to route. Passive application-level tracing is 
transparent and may be performed without access to core 
network infrastructure, though the rate at which data can be 
gathered using this methodology is significantly lower than 
that of network-level tracing. 
Active application-level traces address the scalability 
shortcomings of passive application-level tracing by 
employing an aggressive querying and connection policy 
wherein the monitoring peer attempts to reconnect to and 
interrogate as much of the application-level network as 
possible; ‘crawling’ the P2P network in order to maximize the 
size and typicality of trace data. While this approach improves 
the quality of trace-data and the speed at which it is acquired, 
it does so at the expense of transparency due to the disruptive 
effect of repeated reconnections and high message generation 
on the P2P system being monitored. 
Section 3 discusses significant empirical studies of P2P file 
sharing networks, organized according to the tracing 
methodology used. The findings of these studies are 
summarized along with their shortcomings. 
3. Empirical Studies of P2P File Sharing 
systems 
     This section presents significant P2P traffic monitoring 
studies belonging to each of the tracing methodology classes 
introduced in section 2, spanning the period from 2000 to 
2008. The specific methodology of each study is described 
alongside its significant findings. Based upon this survey, the 
benefits and limitations of each class of monitoring approach 
are discussed along with the general limitations of current 
P2P studies.  While it is impossible to perform an exhaustive 
study in a single paper, this survey covers the most significant 
and oft cited studies of P2P networks. 
 
A. Network-Level Monitoring 
     The first network-level study of P2P traffic was 
performed by Plonka et al. [6]. This study analyzed the 
bandwidth consumed by Napster [1] on the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison network during March 2000. A seven 
hour trace was gathered using a specially developed tool called 
FlowScan to monitor Napster traffic. FlowScan first identified 
nodes communicating with the napster.com servers as 
potential P2P participants and then applied simple heuristics to 
the node’s incoming and outgoing traffic in order to identify 
Napster-related traffic. The Plonka study found that as early as 
2000, P2P applications generated a comparable volume of 
traffic to the web at 23.1% of total bandwidth, compared to 
20.9% for web traffic. Unfortunately, it is difficult to assess 
the accuracy of this study due to the lack of published details 
regarding the FlowScan traffic-catagorisation system. 
However, the short duration of the trace is likely to have 
resulted in inaccuracy, particularly as other studies have found 
significant time-of-day variations [10]. Nevertheless, the 
Plonka study was useful in highlighting the increasing 
bandwidth consumption observed during the early days of P2P 
applications. 
Plonka’s observations on the growing volume of traffic being 
generated by P2P applications were corroborated by in June 
2002 by a University of Washington study conducted by 
Saroiu et al [2] Their nine day trace found that P2P traffic 
consumed 43% of campus bandwidth, compared to just 14% 
for web traffic - a significant increase since the Plonka study. 
The Saroiu study identified traffic generated by the two 
dominant P2P systems of the day; Gnutella 0.4 [22] and Kazaa 
[13] based upon common port usage. In addition to raw traffic 
data, the Saroiu study reported more fine-grained information 
about the P2P work-load. This included the finding that, on 
average, objects retrieved from P2P networks were three 
orders of magnitude larger than objects retrieved from the web 
along with the finding that a small subset of peers are 
responsible for the majority of P2P traffic - a finding that 
corroborates the results obtained by Adar et al [7] in their 
passive application-level study (see section 3.B). 
Gummadi et al. continued P2P monitoring work at the 
University of Washington with a 200-day trace of Kazaa 
traffic in 2003 [3]. This was recorded using a similar 
methodology to the 2002 trace, except that traffic was 
identified based upon Kazaa-specific HTTP headers rather 
than by port use. Uniquely Gummadi’s 2003 trace was long 
enough to observe seasonal variations in P2P traffic and the 
effect of changing network policies on P2P workloads. Using 
this trace, Gummadi developed a detailed parameterized model 
of P2P workloads, which can be used by developers to 
generate realistic evaluation data. 
Accurate identification of P2P traffic is a vital component of 
network-level P2P monitoring. In the case of the Plonka trace 
[6], identification was simplified by Napster’s semi-centralized 
architecture [1], while the Saroiu [10] and Gummadi [3] trace 
identified traffic by port number and header data respectively. 
However, recent research [20] has demonstrated that users are 
increasingly moving to P2P systems that aim to avoid 
monitoring through the use of non-standard ports and 
encrypted header data. To address this issue, Subhabrata et al. 
[23] have developed a system for real-time network-level 
identification of P2P traffic. This system was implemented as 
an extension to the AT&T’s Gigascope [24] high speed traffic 
monitor. Subhabrata et al. evaluated their traffic identification 
approach using a 24 hour week-day trace and an 18 hour 
weekend trace gathered in November 2003 on a major internet 
backbone. This was augmented with a 6 day trace of traffic on 
a VPN where network administrators attempt to block P2P 
traffic, also conducted in November 2003. Subhabrata’s 
approach proved capable of identifying traffic from today’s 
popular P2P systems in real-time for traffic flows of up to 
1Gbps while maintaining misidentification rates of less than 
5%. While the trace data gathered for this study was used to 
evaluate their traffic monitoring approach, the authors did not 
attempt to further characterize or examine the P2P traffic that 
they observed. The extended version of Gigascope used in this 
study is capable of identifying traffic from Gnutella [12], 
Fasttrack [4], eDonkey [13], Direct Connect [14] and 
Bittorrent [16]. Subhabrata’s identification approach is based 
upon the flexible concept of application signatures, which can 
be used to categorize traffic using a wide range of metrics. 
The growing use of public and application independent 
anonymization services such as Tor [25] provides an 
interesting new target for network-level monitoring. Tor is 
itself a P2P system, which uses an overlay network of routers 
to enable anonymous outgoing and incoming connections. Any 
traffic sent via Tor is forwarded from peer to peer on the Tor 
overlay, ultimately reaching an exit peer, at which point the 
packet is available is forwarded on to its original destination. 
Viewed from the destination, the traffic appears to originate at 
the Tor exit node, thus protecting client user’s identity. Tor 
also allows nodes participating in the overlay to provide 
services which may be accessed as though they are hosted at 
the exit node, allowing for the anonymous hosting of internet 
services. As Tor is effectively application independent, it is 
possible to implement network-level monitoring by hosting an 
exit peer and monitoring the outbound and inbound traffic. 
Standard network-level monitoring tools may be used for this 
purpose just as they would on a network gateway; however, 
monitoring Tor traffic has two significant advantages over 
monitoring at gateway locations. Firstly, as Tor is accessible 
world-wide, monitoring Tor exit peers are unlikely to exhibit 
geographic bias. Secondly, no special access to network 
infrastructure is required. 
The first study of Tor was performed by Bauer et al. at the 
university of Colorado, Boulder in 2007 [26]. Bauer analyzed 
Tor’s vulnerability to attack and discovered an inverse 
relationship between the degree of optimization in the Tor 
overlay and its resilience against attack. In 2008, McCoy et al. 
extended Boulder’s work by performing a detailed 
characterization of Tor traffic [27] using the methodology 
outlined above. The study first provided a breakdown of Tor 
traffic by type, finding that web and Bittorrent data makes up 
the majority of traffic. The study also analyzed the location of 
Tor users, finding a significant geographic bias. McCoy also 
found that a significant level of Tor misuse occurs, for 
example snooping on plain-text data such as POP email traffic. 
Loesing et al. performed a detailed performance measurement 
of Tor traffic in 2008, analyzing the QoS properties and 
specifically the latency of Tor. Based upon this detailed 
analysis, performance optimisations to the Tor protocol were 
suggested. 
In each of the studies discussed above, network-level tracing 
was used to record the low-level characteristics of P2P traffic 
flows on private networks. Network-level tracing is potentially 
transparent, scalable and allows comparison of traffic from 
multiple domains side-by-side. However, with the exception of 
Tor monitoring, this approach is dependent upon access to 
core network infrastructure, which is not always feasible. 
While researchers may have access to gateway infrastructure 
on large private networks, such as academic networks, data 
obtained from such sources should be viewed as potentially 
biased due to differences between the characteristics of the 
private network’s users and general Internet users. 
B. Passive Application-Level Monitoring 
The first passive application-level trace of a P2P system was 
performed by Adar and Huberman in 2000 on the Gnutella 0.4 
network [7]. This 24-hour trace logged resource-discovery 
traffic which was then used to assess the prevalence and 
characteristics of a problem known as ‘free riding’, wherein 
users download resources from, but do not upload resources to 
a P2P file-sharing system. The Adar trace was performed by 
modifying the open-source ‘Furi’ Gnutella client (no longer 
available) to monitor search, response and peer discovery 
messages. Adar and Huberman discovered that participation in 
Gnutella was highly asymmetrical with 66% of peers sharing 
no files at all and almost 50% of all files being served by the 
top 1% of hosts. This finding was significant as it contradicted 
the (then) conventional wisdom that user participation in P2P 
file sharing systems is symmetrical. Adar’s result was later 
corroborated by Saroiu’s 2002 network-level study [10]. 
Hughes et al [4] revisited the results of the Adar trace in 2004 
on the Gnutella 0.6 network [12] based upon a one week trace. 
The trace was performed using a specially developed 
monitoring tool based on the Jtella base classes [17]. The 
monitoring peer connected to the Gnutella network as an 
Ultrapeer [12] and periodically reconnected in order to 
maximize the size and typicality of its sample-base. Hughes 
discovered that in the four years since the Adar study, the 
proportion of free-riders had increased from 66% to 85%, 
while corroborating Adar’s finding that the top 1% of hosts 
serve almost 50% of all files. Hughes speculated that the 
increase in free riding may be the result of an increase in 
prosecution of copyright infringement. Hughes et al. revisited 
this data point using their 2005 trace and found that the level 
of free riding on Gnutella had continued to increase - to over 
95% [28]. This trace was also used to assess the level of illegal 
pornographic material being distributed on the Gnutella 
network [8]. The study found that an average of 1.6% of 
searches and 2.4% of responses contained references to illegal 
pornography, though this material is distributed by a tiny 
subset of peers that typically share nothing else. Hughes et al. 
refined this result in 2008 looking only at the level of traffic 
relating to child abuse media. This study found that more than 
1% of search traffic and 1.6% of search-response traffic relates 
to child abuse related media. 
In each of the cases discussed above, passive application-level 
monitoring is used to study application level properties in an 
Internet-wide context. Like network-level monitoring, passive 
application-level monitoring is transparent, however, it does 
not require access to low-level network infrastructure. 
Unfortunately, in cases where a very large sample of network 
traffic is required, passive monitoring would be unsuitable due 
to the small-world properties of modern P2P networks. 
C. Active Application-Level Monitoring 
Ripneau and Foster [9] performed the first active application-
level trace of the Gnutella network from November 2000 to 
May 2001. This study attempted to map the Gnutella network 
in terms of the average number of links between hosts and the 
number of hops that these links represent on the underlying IP 
network. To achieve this, a specialized Gnutella peer known as 
a ‘crawler’ was developed. The crawler connects via the 
normal Gnutella boot-strapping system and uses Gnutella’s 
peer-discovery mechanism [12] to find new peers. The IP 
address of these peers is added to the list of those observed and 
the crawler attempts reconnection in a new location, repeating 
the process and gradually building a ‘map’ of the network. The 
resulting map includes the total number of nodes, the total 
number of links and average traffic data. Based upon the 
findings of this study, Ripneau concluded that the emergent 
structure of the Gnutella network was such that the network’s 
bandwidth consumption would limit its scalability, as 
predicted by Ritter [29]. Unfortunately, Ripneau’s crawling 
approach is invasive, as repeated reconnection affects the P2P 
network. It is also un-scalable due to the computational and 
network expense incurred when crawling the application-level 
network.  
Saroui et al. [10] extended Washington University’s work on 
monitoring P2P systems to the application level with a one 
month crawl of the Gnutella network in May 2001. The 
crawler used a similar methodology to Ripneau and observed 
between 8,000 and 10,000 unique peers, which at that time 
would have accounted for between 25% and 50% of the 
Gnutella network. The 2001 Saroiu trace recorded low-level 
data, including each peer’s IP address, latency and bottleneck 
bandwidth between peers; along with higher level data 
including each peers advertised bandwidth and the number and 
size of files being shared. These high-level properties were 
measured by logging Gnutella’s resource discovery and 
network maintenance messages, while bottleneck bandwidth 
was measured using SProbe [30], a network tool that uses a 
TCP exploit to accurately measure bottleneck bandwidth 
without the need for remote cooperation. 
Chu et al [11] performed the first study that attempted to 
quantify the availability of peers and files on the Gnutella 
network using a forty day trace performed in early 2002. This 
trace was gathered by a tool based upon the Jtella API [17] 
that followed a similar methodology to the Ripneau crawler 
[9]. Search-response messages were intercepted by the crawler 
and unique peers were identified based upon their advertised 
IP and port pairs. The crawler was used to gather a list of 
20,000 unique peers using the ‘BearShare’ and ‘SwapNut’ 
clients, at which point a second program, known as the 
‘tracking manager’ attempted to download each peer’s file-list 
using proprietary BearShare and SwapNut extensions. Using 
this methodology, the availability of peers and files was 
monitored for a period of 40 days beginning on March 28th. 
Chu reported a strong correlation between time-of-day and 
node availability and proposed a model to describe peer 
availability. Additionally, Chu provided a breakdown of 
relative file-type popularity and corroborated the finding of 
Saroiu [10], that file popularity is highly skewed with the top 
10% of files accounting for more than 50% of shared data. A 
clear limitation of Chu’s study lies in the use of proprietary 
extensions to obtain file lists, which limits the size of the trace 
and introduces possible bias due to the limited user-group 
studied. 
Bittorrent is peculiar amongst P2P file sharing systems in that 
it does not implement a resource discovery mechanism. Thus, 
passive application-level monitoring is rendered ineffective 
due to the lack of resource discovery traffic. For this reason, 
Bittorrent studies generally actively query Bittorrent trackers, 
which mediate connection to the file distribution overlay, 
joining this overlay to participate in file distribution if further 
data is required. The first Bittorrent study was performed by 
Izal et al. in 2004 [31] shortly after Bittorrent’s release and 
analyzed the life-span of a files being distributed using 
Bittorrent over a five month period. Izal showed that Bittorrent 
was a highly effective distribution mechanism for popular 
media effectively addressing the problem of ‘flash crowds’. In 
2005 Thommes et al. [32] further examined the ‘fairness’ of 
the Bittorrent protocol. The study found that Bittorrent 
performs near-optimally in terms of uplink bandwidth 
utilization, but that low bandwidth peers frequently 
downloaded significantly more than they uploaded. While the 
differential experience of Bittorrent peers may be considered 
unfairness, as it was by the authors of this paper, it may also be 
responsible for Bittorrent’s high level of popularity; as the 
protocol is capable of catering to the needs of users on both 
high bandwidth and slow connections. 
In each of the cases discussed above, active application-level 
monitoring has been used to study P2P traffic properties in an 
Internet-wide context, where a very large and typical body of 
trace data was required (e.g. mapping the Gnutella network). 
Active application-level monitoring is easy to deploy and 
should not contain local bias; however, the aggressive 
reconnection and interrogation approach employed makes this 
approach invasive and limits its scalability. Due to the 
invasiveness of this approach, active application-level 
monitoring may be easily detected and due in part to extensive 
copyright enforcement activities, file sharing user communities 
actively search for and attempt to circumvent active 
monitoring approaches. 
D. Summary of Monitoring Approaches 
This paper introduced a classification scheme for empirical 
studies of P2P file sharing systems based upon the tracing 
methodology that they employ: network-level monitoring, 
passive application-level monitoring or active application-level 
monitoring. In the context of this classification, significant 
empirical studies were reviewed along with the benefits and 
drawbacks of each approach. These are summarized below: 
Network-level monitoring is transparent to the network and 
highly scalable. It is capable of comparing traffic flows from 
multiple P2P systems side-by-side and is well suited to 
characterizing P2P traffic on large private networks; however, 
it is poorly suited for performing global monitoring of P2P 
systems due to the possibility of local bias. Moreover, 
network-level monitoring requires low-level access to core 
network infrastructure, which is often unfeasible. Examples of 
network-level monitoring studies include [2] and [6]. 
Passive application-level monitoring is also scalable and 
transparent to the network. It can be performed without access 
to core network infrastructure, though it does not provide as 
large a volume of trace data as network-level monitoring or 
crawler-based application-level monitoring. Furthermore, it is 
inherently protocol specific. Passive application-level 
monitoring is thus best suited to instances where network-level 
monitoring is impossible or where a non-invasive approach is 
desirable. Examples of passive application-level monitoring 
studies include [7] and [8]. 
Active application-level monitoring is less transparent and 
scalable than either network-level or passive application-level 
monitoring; however, it allows large volumes of trace data to 
be gathered without low-level access to the network 
infrastructure. It is thus the best approach where global 
network information is required and access to the underlying 
network infrastructure is not possible. Examples of active 
application-level monitoring studies include [10] and [11]. 
 
Figure 1 – Time Distribution of P2P Traces 
 
P2P traces such as those presented in this paper have proven 
invaluable in informing research in the field of P2P systems, 
however, each of these studies provides only a piece of the 
puzzle; describing a subset of P2P traffic characteristics for a 
subset of protocols over the duration of the trace. Often, papers 
which cite these studies fail to adequately consider such 
limitations. For example, the data-point provided by Adar’s 
2000 study of free riding [7] has been used in a significant 
body of research until the present day, however, when this 
study was revisited by Hughes et al. [4] in 2005, it was 
discovered that free riding had increased, revealing a 
significant, and (until that point), unidentified trend. 
Figure 1 illustrates the date and duration of each of the P2P 
traces discussed in this paper. As figure 1 illustrates, few of the 
P2P studies presented in this paper are of sufficient duration to 
identify trends in P2P traffic, rather they simply provide a 
data-point for the monitored characteristics. The notable 
exceptions to this are Gummadi’s 2003 Kazaa trace [3] which 
was long enough to observe seasonal variations and Hughes’ 
2005 study of free-riding [5] which, by revisiting Adar’s 2000 
experiment [7] was able to show an intervening trend in  user 
behavior. 
 
4. Limitations of Existing Work 
There are a number of significant shortcomings in the current 
body of research on P2P traffic monitoring. The first and 
perhaps most significant of which is the wide-spread use of 
closed data sets. As can be seen from Figure 1, P2P studies 
may require weeks or even months of P2P traffic data. While it 
is understandable that after investing significant time and 
effort in gathering a data set, researchers may be reluctant to 
make this data public, this  prevents the findings of studies 
being verified using different methodologies and prevents 
trace data being revisited in new contexts. 
Another significant gap exists in the body of work on P2P 
monitoring regarding the identification of underlying trends. 
For example, the data-point provided by Adar’s 2000 study of 
free riding [7] was revisited by Hughes in 2004 [5] and 2005 
[28], each time revealing a significantly different data point. It 
may be is possible that other equally significant trends might 
be discovered by revisiting past studies. For example, would 
the growing popularity of digital video be reflected by an 
increase in the availability of such files since Chu’s [11] 2002 
study of file availability? Despite the possibility of exposing 
significant trends in user behaviour, few studies choose to 
revisit earlier data-points. 
Most empirical studies of P2P file sharing systems are 
concerned only with the technical characteristics of P2P traffic 
(files shared, bandwidth usage etc.). While this information is 
critical for simulation of P2P traffic and for the development 
of approaches to encouraging positive user behaviour, the next 
step, reasoning about the social and psychological factors 
which produce this behaviour, is rarely taken. Furthermore, 
most studies do not take into account the real-world factors 
which may affect P2P traffic. Notable exceptions to this are 
the studies by Adar [7] and Hughes [5] [8] [28] [33], that 
explicitly consider the social factors which are responsible for 
observed behaviour. 
5. Design of an Open P2P Tracing System 
This paper has made the case that an open, easy to access and 
long-term P2P trace is required to improve our understanding 
of P2P file sharing systems. This section now discusses the 
design and implementation of such a system: The Open P2P 
Tracing System. As previously described, the system will use 
a passive application-level tracing methodology [5] to gather 
data. The implementation of this functionality will now be 
described. 
4.1. Tracing Functionality 
Implementation of tracing functionality is dependent upon the 
P2P system being monitored. As the Open Tracing System 
aims to provide a widely reusable data set, we intend to 
monitor several of today’s most popular P2P systems, 
including Gnutella [12], Fasttrack [13], eDonkey [14], 
DirectConnect [15] and Bittorrent [16]. In order to minimize 
the time required to port monitoring code to additional P2P 
networks we implement logging functionality by modifying 
existing open source clients available for each P2P network. 
Analysis of such clients, which include Jtella [17], Open 
DirectConnect [18] and Azureus [19] revealed that each 
shared elements of common structure. Of particular 
significance in terms of implementing tracing support was 
that each client implements a single routing component which 
is used to process incoming and outgoing messages. It is into 
this routing component that we insert monitoring code. This is 
shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1.  System Architecture 
In order to ensure that sufficient data is gathered, the system 
is capable of maintaining a large number of network 
connections, for example by connecting as an Ultrapeer when 
monitoring Gnutella. Furthermore, in order to ensure data is 
representative, the system periodically re-connects to different 
areas of the P2P network. 
4.2. Maintaining User Anonymity 
Open publication of IP addresses and other identifying data is 
ethically dubious and would likely have a number of 
undesirable effects. Furthermore, studies have suggested that 
P2P users are migrating to those file sharing systems which are 
more difficult to monitor [20]. It is therefore likely that 
publication of user data from one P2P system would drive 
users to other, unmonitored systems or perhaps even result in 
the P2P community attempting to exclude the tracing client. 
Recent research [20] has also suggested that the level of 
perceived anonymity offered by P2P networks has a 
significant effect on user behaviour. This implies that the 
publication of IP addresses might cause a significant ‘observer 
effect’. 
While maintaining anonymity is desirable, a globally unique 
user identifier (GUID) is often required to accurately track the 
behaviour of users over time. For this reason, as data is 
gathered, all IP addresses and user-names are switched for a 
randomly assigned GUID.  Any additional information 
encapsulated in the original identifier, such as country and 
service provider, is resolved and stored separately in the 
database. 
Replacing real world identifiers with a randomly assigned but 
consistent GUID prevents third parties from associating trace 
data with individuals. However, long term this method would 
lead to the accumulation of data on millions of P2P users, 
which gives rise to significant security implications. We have 
therefore arrived at a compromise solution, wherein we only 
attempt to ensure that GUIDs remain unique during a typical 
period of connection (session), after which time the IP/GUID 
mapping is discarded and, if that peer is observed again, it will 
be assigned a new GUID. 
This compromise between maintaining anonymity and user 
tracking is evaluated in section 5. 
4.3. Data Collection and Storage 
Due to the scalability problems associated with resource 
discovery on decentralized P2P networks, P2P systems have 
increasingly moved towards Super-node architectures such as 
the architecture used in Kazaa [13] or the Gnutella 0.6 ultra-
peer scheme [12]. Concurrently, the scalability problems 
which arise from the use of a single indexing server have 
prompted centralised systems to move towards more 
decentralized architectures that utilize user-hosted indexing 
servers as demonstrated by DirectConnect and eDonkey. In 
both cases, the presence of peers on the application-level 
network which are responsible for routing a greater proportion 
of messages facilitates application-level monitoring. By 
connecting to the network as a Gnutella ‘ultra-peer’, a Direct 
Connect ‘hub’ or eDonkey ‘server’, a greater proportion of 
traffic can be captured using passive application-level 
monitoring. 
The Bittorrent network is a special case. As Bittorrent does not 
support resource discovery, torrents are indexed on publicly 
available trackers, which are accessible on the web. Thus 
tracing of Bittorrent may be achieved by querying the trackers 
for details of users currently participating in each per-file 
overlay. An overview of this tracing methodology is described 
in more detail in [36]. 
As we intend that tracing data should be made accessible to a 
broad audience, we will use a standard MySQL database for 
data storage. As SQL is currently the most popular database 
technology for online applications we hope this will maximize 
the accessibility of the system. A separate SQL database is 
maintained for each P2P system being monitored and each of 
these databases contains per-message tables. Each message 
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that is stored in the database is time-stamped, facilitating the 
retrieval of data for a specific instant or time-period. In order 
to maintain flexibility, the system also logs all message types 
as it is difficult to predict in advance what data may be of 
interest to other researchers 
4.4. Data Access and Presentation 
Alongside raw SQL access, we also provide a web-based 
method of data access for interested parties. We hope this will 
allow the system to support a range of users with diverse 
requirements. We envision that three classes of user will make 
use of the system: i) corporate users, ii) computing researchers 
and iii) non-computing researchers. 
Corporate users of the system might include P2P developers, 
who could use the system to assess the market penetration of 
their P2P products, and the music and film industry that might 
use the system to assess the extent to which their products 
were being distributed on P2P systems. To facilitate access for 
corporate users in particular, the system supports on-the-fly 
generation of common graphs illustrating both current and 
historic data based on a number of criteria including: P2P 
client popularity, file popularity and availability, level of user 
participation and free-riding. The system is also capable of 
exporting this same data in common formats such as comma 
separated value (CSV) files and Excel (XLS) spreadsheet 
documents. To further facilitate the association of P2P traffic 
with real-world factors, graphical data is annotated with news 
articles containing references to P2P, which are culled from 
RSS feeds. This functionality may be used to answer questions 
such as whether high-profile copyright prosecutions increase 
levels of free-riding, or whether news about a specific P2P 
client affected its level of use. 
 
Figure 2.  Web Interface of the Open Tracing System 
Computing researchers are most likely to be interested in 
accessing raw traffic data provided by the system. This is 
possible through direct access to the SQL database which 
allows more versatility in interrogation than hard-coded trend 
data that the system provides. 
Non-computing researchers are supported by the systems 
ability to export traffic data in CSV and XLS formats, which 
can both be accessed using common office software. It is also 
possible that ‘casual’ Internet users may find this data of 
interest, though the requirements of these users have not been 
explicitly considered in the design of the system. The web 
interface is shown in Figure 2 below. 
4.5. Implementation Status and Access 
The current implementation of the Open Tracing System 
focuses on the tracing of the Gnutella network, the results of 
which are being used as a basis to evaluate system 
functionality (as will be discussed in section 5). Adding 
support for tracing additional networks is being implemented 
in parallel to this. 
The system is currently at a pre-alpha stage and therefore 
access to it must currently be arranged through the authors of 
this paper. However, we are actively looking for case studies, 
such as those described in section 6, which we hope will guide 
system development. We anticipate that, in due course, the 
open P2P tracing system will be made freely accessible online. 
6. Initial evaluation results 
We have begun analyzing the performance of the Open P2P 
Tracing System in terms of its network, computational and 
storage requirements. The system is hosted and evaluated on a 
2.8GHz Intel P4 with 512MB RAM and a 100GB hard drive 
connected to the Internet via a high-speed academic network. 
In order to minimize invasiveness during evaluation, the 
modified tracing peer maintains a single ultra-peer connection 
and allows unlimited incoming leaf-node connections. As 
previously described, in order to ensure the typicality of our 
trace, the system periodically reconnects to the network at an 
interval of six hours. 
5.1. Networking Requirements 
The local network requirements of tracing Gnutella have been 
assessed through experimentation, while gathering trace data. 
This reveals that the system consumes an average bandwidth 
of 98kbps as a result of routing resource discovery messages 
and an additional 9kbps due to routing control messages, 
which is commensurate with results obtained elsewhere [7]. 
The networking requirements of passive application level 
tracing can easily be met by our available networking 
infrastructure. 
5.2. Storage Requirements 
The storage requirements of our tracing methodology were 
assessed during the gathering of a single-connection Ultrapeer 
trace of the Gnutella network, conducted over a period of one 
month. Experimental results are shown in Figure 3.  
The storage requirements of tracing the Gnutella network 
using MySQL’s standard data compression range from a 
minimum of 40MB per day to a maximum of 95MB per day. 
While this makes long-term tracing feasible using standard 
desktop storage hardware, available storage capacity still 
forms the bottleneck in our tracing capability and for this 
reason, only one tracing connection per monitored network 
will be maintained by the Open Tracing System for the 
immediate future.  
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Figure 3.  Storage Requirements of Tracing 
5.3. Anonymization 
As previously discussed, the anonymization approach used is a 
compromise between storing large volumes of user records 
and providing a consistent GUID to support session tracking. 
During our month long trace of the Gnutella network, we 
performed a number of experiments to determine an optimal 
IP discard time. 
We first monitored session lengths across our trace and found 
that more than half lasted less than one hour and that more 
than 80% less than two hours, this is commensurate with 
results obtained elsewhere [10]. Figure 4 shows the 
relationship between IP discard time and the percentage of 
sessions where any data would have been lost. The ‘long tail’ 
of the graph shown in Figure 4 is due to the presence of a 
small number of highly available peers with server-like 
characteristics and implies that total session coverage would 
require an unfeasibly long ID-discard period, in turn leading to 
the maintenance of very large numbers of IP addresses. 
Figure 5 explores the relationship between discard time and 
the number of IP addresses stored by the system. The graph 
shows that the number of stored IP’s varies significantly over 
the period of our trace and based upon the discard time used. 
Based upon these results, we have selected a discard time of 6 
hours. This period successfully captures 93% of sessions as 
shown in Figure 5 and results in the open tracing system 
storing an average of fewer than 800 IP addresses at any one 
time as shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 4.  Effect of ID Discard Period on Lost Session Data 
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Figure 5.  Effect of Discard-Period on Number of Stored IPs 
6. Exploiting Open Tracing 
In order to better illustrate how an open P2P tracing system 
may be used to expand our understanding of how P2P file 
sharing networks are used, this section provides a detailed 
summary of studies that have been performed by Lancaster 
University using the same passive application-level tracing 
methodology.  
“Free Riding on Gnutella Revisited: the Bell Tolls?” 
revisited Adar’s 2001 study of Gnutella traffic. Adar found 
that (i) over two thirds of Gnutella users download files while 
not uploading – effectively free riding and (ii) user 
contribution was highly asymmetric with the top contributors 
providing a disproportionate share of files. Our 2005 study 
found that in the intervening four years, this situation had 
worsened. While we found similarly asymmetric contribution 
levels, the number of contributing peers had fallen by more 
than half. The stark difference between these data points 
shows the benefit of revisiting established data points, a key 
goal of the open tracing system. 
“Is Deviant Behaviour the Norm on P2P File Sharing 
Networks?” was performed in 2005 in collaboration with 
psychologists, to answer the question of whether the 
perception of anonymity and lack of censorship on Gnutella 
encourages the distribution of illegal pornographic material. 
Our study found that while the level of resource discovery 
traffic relating to illegal pornographic material was high (1.6% 
of searches and 2.4% of responses), that this traffic was 
generated by a small, yet active subset of the network that 
shared nothing else. This finding has useful implications for 
the policing of P2P file sharing networks, but more 
importantly shows how collaboration between academic 
disciplines, another key goal of the open tracing system, can 
lead to better understanding of P2P user behaviour. 
“Supporting Law Enforcement in Digital Communities 
through Natural Language Analysis” revisited our 2005 trace 
data, looking specifically at the level of traffic related to child 
abuse material. We found that 1% of search traffic related to 
such material and 1.6% of response traffic.  Building upon this 
analysis in collaboration with linguistics researchers and child 
protection researchers and professionals, this paper suggested 
an approach to automating the policing of P2P file sharing 
systems for child abuse material. As with the previous study 
this illustrates the significant benefits of making P2P files 
sharing trace data to other disciplines. 
7. Future Work and Conlusions 
This paper has highlighted significant shortcomings in the 
existing body of work on P2P monitoring, and described the 
implementation of a large-scale, open and ongoing trace that 
can be freely accessed by researchers from diverse 
backgrounds. Based upon an extensive review of existing P2P 
studies, we have selected a non-invasive tracing methodology 
that we will incrementally apply to five of today’s most 
popular P2P file sharing networks. At the current time, tracing 
functionality has been implemented for the Gnutella network 
and evaluation of the system shows that our methodology is 
capable of gathering, anonymizing and logging Gnutella traffic 
in real-time using standard desktop hardware.  The system 
facilitates access for users from diverse backgrounds- a direct 
interface to the SQL database allows versatile access for 
computing researchers, while a simplified web interface and 
on-the-fly computation of common P2P characteristics such as 
the level of ‘free riding’ and relative file-type popularity 
facilitate access for those from non-computing fields.  
In the short term, future work will focus on the implementation 
of tracing functionality for additional P2P systems. In the 
longer term we intend to investigate incorporating Natural 
Language Processing mechanisms into the system to allow the 
user to perform more sophisticated analyses. In addition to this 
we will also examine the feasibility of using technologies such 
as Aspect Oriented Programming to assist in the non-invasive 
monitoring of P2P systems, and also to investigate alternative, 
more scalable data storage solutions. 
In parallel to extending tracing support, we intend to evaluate 
the usefulness of the system as a tool, using a number of case 
studies. Part of this will include working with psychology 
researchers to investigate the process of group formation in 
P2P communities. This will build upon our previous work [5] 
[8] [28] [33] and allow us to explore the extent to which the 
system can support inter-disciplinary research. 
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